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Abstract
In his inaugural lecture as director of the Institute for Social Research at the University of Frankfurt 
(1933), Horkheimer points out the need for a new understanding of history that avoids the contemporary 
versions of the Hegelian Verklärung. He synthesizes this challenge with an imperative: to do justice to 
past suffering. The result of this appeal can be found in the works of the members of the Frankfurt School 
in the form of multiple, even divergent, trains of thought that reach with unlike intensities the current 
debates on memory and its link with history. This paper focuses on three of these trains, which can be 
traced back to different periods of the work of Herbert Marcuse. It intends to systematize and present 
what can be considered alternative—although not necessarily contradictory—approaches aroused from 
the same concern over the critical power of nonreconciliatory memory: first, a genealogy inquiry that de-
constructs the reified character of the given; second, a recollection of past images of happiness; and finally, 
a memory of the limits of all attainable freedom. Exploring these three moments, their shortcomings and 
tensions, may shed light on the complexity and present importance of the challenge they intend to face.
Laura Arese
Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
Essays Philos (2018)19:2  |  DOI:  10.7710/1526-0569.1615
Correspondence:  arese.laura@gmail.com
Essays in Philosophy
Volume 19, Issue 2Essays in Philosophy
2 | eP1615 Essays in Philosophy
In his inaugural lecture as director of the Institute for Social Research at the University 
of Frankfurt,1 Horkheimer summarizes at its central points a train of thought that runs 
through the research of several members of the Institute: a reflection on the possibility 
of a relation with the past that avoids the conciliatory perspective prevalent in modern 
philosophies of history. According to such philosophies, the subject of history is not 
individual actors but an abstract totality, historical time is an upward movement, and 
confronting the past cannot but be equal to justifying what happened for the sake of the 
present development. Justifying the past means rationalizing the existence of each singu-
larity as a necessary moment of a process of which singularities are only one part. There-
fore, the rationality of the total process leaves “the demise of the individual . . . without 
philosophical significance.”2 In the third decade of the twentieth century, Horkheimer’s 
criticism may sound anachronistic. However, he asserts that the fall of the nineteenth 
century’s principal modern philosophies of history did not give way to a better, more 
productive or critical link to the past. On the contrary, after the First World War, 
abandoned by the philosophical conviction of having its true reality in the 
divine Idea intrinsic to the whole, the individual experienced the world as 
a “medley of arbitrariness” and itself as “the tribute which existence and the 
transient world exact.” A sober look at the individual and the other [Nächste] 
no longer revealed . . . the cunning of which Reason was said to avail itself. . 
. . The suffering and death of individuals threatened to appear in their naked 
senselessness.3
In this way, the Verklärung returns, although in new forms. Horkheimer’s polemic tar-
gets contemporary theories and discourses, such as vitalism and nationalist rhetoric, 
which, despite their differences, proved to be authentic and dangerous heirs of Hegel. 
Just like him, they support interpretations of history that “submerge hopeless individ-
ual existence into the bosom or—to speak with Sombarthe—the “‘gilded background’ 
[Goldgrund] of meaningful totalities.”4 
More than the answer it offers, the interesting aspect of this text is how it poses the ques-
1  Max Horkheimer, “The Present Situation of Social Philosophy and the Task for an Institute for Social 
Research” (1931), in Between Philosophy and Social Science: Selected Writings (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1993).
2  Ibid., 4.
3  Ibid., 5. Horkheimer is quoting Hegel. See Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of 
World History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 89. 
4  Horkheimer, “The Present Situation of Social Philosophy,” 9. 
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tion of a “social philosophy” that is up to the challenge of a nonreconciliatory approach 
to the past. Such an approach should make it possible to reckon with the factuality of his-
tory without resorting to transcendental instances that endow it with meaning. It should 
also be capable of considering social phenomena from a global point of view that takes in 
to account macro structures and processes, but without hiding the “suffering and death, 
stupidity and baseness”5 inherent in individual existence. In other words, it must account 
for the nonrationality of what happened without renouncing it to understand and pre-
serve it in its singularity. Horkheimer synthesizes this challenge with an imperative: to 
do justice to the past. This motto, which can be understood as the positive formulation 
of the rejection of the Verklärung, takes on a different meaning in the thinking of the dif-
ferent members of the Institute (and other authors linked to critical theory as well). Yet 
for almost all of them, the starting point is the insight already presented in the inaugural 
conference of 1933, which can be described as an inversion of the Hegelian philosophy 
of history. While in Hegel the identification between the real and the rational allows the 
justification of everything that happened, in critical theory’s approach the assumption of 
the nonidentity of both terms gives rise to the opposite result: criticism. In the same way, 
while the Verklärung reaches the present as an affirmation of what it is, the critical recol-
lection of the past, inversely, introduces in the present a gap through which the rebellion 
against the injustice of the given could begin.
Now, the result of this dispute with the new forms of Hegelianism is not a “counter philoso-
phy of history,” as systematic and encompassing as its adversary. Quite the opposite, the 
result of the controversy can be found in the works of the members of the Frankfurt School 
in the form of multiple, even divergent, trains of thought that reach with different intensities 
the current debates. This paper focuses on some of these trains, which can be traced back to 
three different periods of the work of Herbert Marcuse. Rather than establishing systematic 
links between them, I intend to collect and present what can be consider three different 
paths aroused from the same concern on the critical power of a nonreconciliatory memory. 
I. The 1930s: Genealogy and Unreification.
The first explicit reference to the link between recovery of the past and criticism can be 
found in a text of 1932, “The Foundation of Historical Materialism.”6 In this writing, 
Marcuse draws from the recently published Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 
a conception that would be central to his work during the 1930s: the “historicity of hu-
5  Ibid., 4.
6  Herbert Marcuse, “The Foundation of Historical Materialism,” in Studies in Critical Philosophy (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1973), 1–48.
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man essence.”7 He points out that, in the Manuscript, Marx argues that this historicity 
lies in the ability of the human being to constitute itself freely through work. Work is a 
process in which man recognizes himself as such thanks to the free production of objects 
external to him, as well as the relationships he establishes with others in the development 
of that activity. The totality of the relations and objects thus constituted is the objective 
world that each nascent generation finds as a given objectivity. This world, insofar as it 
is understood as the result of work, that is, of a process of objectification, contains “the 
reality of a past human life, which, although it belongs to the past, is still present in the 
form it has given to the objective world.”8
Then, reification, understood in a diachronic sense, may be defined as the process by 
which that “past contained in the present” is concealed. The reified world is revealed as 
something fixed, a res already and forever defined in its essential features, abstracted 
from the work-process that made it possible. So, work becomes alienated work. When 
this happens, man becomes unable to recognize his action in his own product, which is 
7  The present analysis excludes what has been called Marcuse’s “Heideggerian period.” According to 
interpreters like Colomer, this period begins with the reading of Being and Time (in 1927), and finishes in 
1933–34, as three important events occurred: Heidegger’s “Rektoratsrede,” Marcuse’s entry in the Institute 
of Social Research of the University of Frankfurt, and the publication of his articles “Philosophy of Failure: 
the Work of Karl Jaspers,” “German Philosophy in the Twentieth Century,” and “The Struggle against 
Liberalism in the Totalitarian Conception of the State.” Colomer claims that in these articles Marcuse 
clearly formulates a strong critique of Heidegger’s conception of historicity and opts definitively for 
Marxism, giving up the project of merging it with Heidegger’s “concrete philosophy”  (see Jordi Magnet 
Colomer, “El joven Marcuse y su camino de Heidegger a Horkheimer,” Eikasia: Revista de filosofía 49 
(May 2013): 225–40). Following this interpretation, the present analysis focuses on the writings after 
this turning point in Marcuse’s work. Although his writings of the twenties are significant and should 
be considered in a larger study, they will not be taken into account here because it is from the thirties on 
that Marcuse’s reflection on history and memory is formulated in the terms proposed by Horkheimer 
in the inaugural conference of 1933. On the other hand, one text analysed here is dated before the turn 
pointed out by Colomer: “The Foundation of historical materialism,” of 1932, written as The Economic 
and Philosophical Manuscripts, were published for the first time. I suggest that the role of this text in the 
within Marcuse’s work must be reconsidered. Marcuse himself considers it as the precise place of his post-
Heideggerian turn when, in a dialogue with Habermas, he says that the publication of the Manuscripts was 
was probably the turn and henceforth “from that moment the problem Heidegger versus Marx stopped 
being a problem for me” (see Jürgen Habermas, “Diálogo con Herbert Marcuse,” in Perfiles Filosófico-
políticos (Madrid: Taurus, 1975), 239, translation is mine. Colomer, however, agrees with Habermas who, 
in this same interview, insists that in “The Foundation,” the attempt to “appropriate Marx in the terms 
of the (Heideggerian) fundamental ontology” persists (Ibid., 250). I think that, as I shall show in what 
follows, both the text’s attempt to analyze the process of reification and its proposal of an articulation 
between social theory, historical understanding, and praxis indicate an important theoretical affinity with 
the works after 1933, which definitively abandon the initial enthusiasm for Heidegger.
8  Marcuse, “The Foundation of Historical Materialism,” 4. 
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to say, to recognize his ability to transcend the given in order to transform it according 
to his free self-determination. Marcuse comes to the conclusion that the overcoming of 
alienation depends on (although not only on) the recognition of the historicity of the 
objective world. On the basis of this idea, he claims that the development of a historical 
perspective is crucial, for both the critique of bourgeois political economy and the foun-
dation of a new social theory.
In fact, the trap of classical political economy is that it “dismisses the essence of man and 
his history.” By abstracting what is of the process by which it came to be, political economy 
becomes a science about “non-people and an inhuman world of objects and commodities,” 
whose historical facticity can then be poured into immutable laws.9 Thus, a social theory 
that allows for understanding the human world qua human and tends to its transformation 
must recover the historical process by which this world was forged through work and hu-
man praxis. Historiographical genealogy, collective memory, and political consciousness 
go hand in hand. Marcuse thinks he is just being consistent with Marx’s thought10 as he 
states that “Marx is fundamentally convinced that when man is conscious of his history he 
cannot fall into a situation which he has not himself created, and that only he himself can 
liberate himself from any situation.”11 On this point, it may well be asked how this historical 
deconstruction of the given can be a normative horizon for praxis. Certainly, genealogi-
cal history and memory can dilute the reified character of the world by tracing it back to 
its origins. But how does the normative dimension inherent in all political criticism arise 
from this? To answer this question, we must follow Marcuse one step further in his reflec-
9  Ibid., 9.
10  An important source of this reading of Marx is Georg Lukács. Martin Jay shows that although the 
Marxian theory of value already contains the thesis of the presence of the coagulated work of past 
generations in the present, it was Lukács and not Marx who, through his notion of reification, explicitly 
established the emancipating value of the recovery of the past from a materialist perspective. This notion 
of reification is central to Marcuse’s reading of Marx, although he does not explicitly quote him in this 
respect. It is also worth mentioning Jay’s observation that only in the 1940s did Adorno, Benjamin, 
and Horkheimer begin to echo this idea of “reification as forgetting,” which was very important for 
their own theoretical developments. On the other hand, Jay identifies another Lukácsean influence on 
Marcuse that may be discussed. He asserts that Marcuse’s reflections on memory during the 1950s present 
affinities with the pre-Marxist Lukács of The Theory of the Novel, who defends a Platonic conception 
of memory. See Martin Jay, “Anamnestic Totalization: Memory in the Thought of Herbert Marcuse,” in 
Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukács to Habermas  (Los Angeles: University 
of California Press, 1984), 228. Leaving aside the question of the link between the philosophers, the next 
section addresses this characterization of the Marcusean thought in the 1950s as metaphysical, focusing 
specifically on Eros and Civilization.
11  Marcuse, “The Foundation of Historical Materialism,” 35.
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tion on what he calls the “historicity of human essence.” This step, however, is an interest-
ing suggestion that is not further developed and remains unexplored in his later writings. 
Also in “The Foundation,” Marcuse asserts that since Marx “we are no longer dealing 
with an abstract human essence, which remains equally valid at every stage of concrete 
history, but with an essence which can be defined in history and only in history.”12 It 
should be noted that this does not mean that the essence of man can be totally identi-
fied with his factual history. It is significant that Marcuse identifies the essence’s “being 
defined” in history whit its “appearing” in history. The human essence “appears” (that 
is, “is defined”) in history in the form of what “could be”: as possibility. The possibilities 
to which Marcuse refers here derive in principle from certain objective conditions of 
the given social structure, such as the development of the productive forces, the level 
of the collective organization of work, and the balance between the social needs so far 
generated and the available cultural and technological resources. In other words, these 
are possibilities of what man could be according to the objective material development 
of society. Yet, such objective conditions only reveal the “essence of man” if they are rec-
ognized as potentialities of the human. And this recognition occurs in those historical 
moments when men and women draw from the mere factual possibility—that is, what 
could merely be—an “idea of  what the practice should do.”13 This pretension of praxis 
about what should be is not limited to a verification of what can actually be transformed 
in society given the available resources. On the contrary, such pretention, which arises 
only through collective and recollecting organization, translates the mere factual possi-
bilities in a claim of freedom that necessarily transcends them. Taking this into account, 
the “transcendence” regarding factual possibility should not be confused with a “tran-
scendental” nature. Rather, the “idea of  what should be done in practice” is a concrete 
formulation of a singular aspiration of freedom born of historical rebellions and revo-
lutions.14 More than as an “idea” in the classical sense, the “human essence” appears in 
12  Ibid., 28. First italics are mine, the second are Marcuse’s. 
13  Ibid., 53.
14  Marcuse recovers a strange expression of Hegel to underline the singularity of his own materialist 
conception of essence. Hegel defines the essence of man as “a timeless past”: “Past, because it is an image 
of being-in-itself that no longer corresponds to immediate existence; timeless, because recollection has 
preserved it and kept it from disappearing into the past” (Herbert Marcuse, “The Concept of Essence,” 
in Negations: Essays in Critical Theory [London: MyFlyBooks, 2009], 55). Idealism asserts the idea that 
essence is a past that will be recovered in the developing of history by force of a metaphysical necessity, 
and therefore the human memory of it does not have any practical meaning. A materialistic perspective 
of the concept of essence, conversely, claims that the memory that preserves those images of the past 
has a central practical importance because it orients praxis in the fight for a better future, which is no 
longer understood as a metaphysical destiny, but as an open possibility: “The recollection of what can 
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history as an aspiration, inseparable from the praxis that has carried it forward, that is, as 
an image of freedom that guides the particular action. 
In these passages Marcuse uses the English words “recollection” or “remember” to refer to 
the recovery of such historical struggles. The Latin root of “recollection,” recollectus—the 
past participle of recolligere—means to reunite. Similarly, “remember” alludes to the resti-
tution of members, scattered strokes or fragments of a bigger whole. The link with the past 
that this line of thought proposes is no longer the sole “deconstruction” of what appears to 
be res. From a different perspective, it consists of the search for certain moments that serve 
as normative references, moments that may be separated by large periods of time and have 
an indefinite connection between them. Therefore, they must be “recollected” in the sense 
of being put together under an encompassing image of freedom. These moments and the 
constructive operation of collecting them together constitute the milestones of social criti-
cism.
In another text of the thirties, “The Concept of Essence” [1936],15 Marcuse returns briefly to this 
idea. Following some insights of “The Foundation,” he defines “criticism” as the discovery of the 
nonidentity between the “essence” (which, as pointed out, appears in history in the form of unre-
alized latent possibilities of emancipation), and the “appearance,” that is, the facticity of the reified 
world. So he repeats with other words his thesis of a close link between historical consciousness 
and memory, on the one hand, and criticism and emancipation, on the other. Yet, he identifies 
now more clearly the element that makes it possible for historical memory to be more than a 
mere descriptive genealogy. This element is concrete historical past struggles; without them, no 
genealogy could be really critical. Only the memory of concrete struggles “reveals” the “historical 
essence” concealed under the “appearance” of the given, since such episodes are concrete indict-
ments of the repressed possibilities on which the process of reification depends. Crucial is the 
assertion that it is this transcendence of the given (historical, not transcendental) that allows us 
“to sustain faith in the face of failure.” That is to say, only this remembrance keeps alive the ex-
pectation of new rebellion attempts. As Marcuse would say some years later, “But the Reason to 
which Marx was indebted was also, in its day, not ‘there’: it appeared only in its negativity and in 
the struggles of those who revolted against the existent, who protested and who were beaten. With 
them, Marx’s thought has kept faith—in the face of defeat and against the dominating Reason.”16
authentically be becomes a power that shapes the future. The demonstration and preservation of essence 
become the motive idea of practice aimed at transformation” (Ibid.).
15  Ibid.
16  Herbert Marcuse, “Epilogue: The New German Edition of Marx’s 18th Brumaire of Louis Napoleon,” 
Radical America (July–August 1969): 59.
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 In short, in the Marcusian reflection of the thirties two aspects or dimensions of memory 
as criticism can be identified. On the one hand, Marcuse reflects on the process of “un-
reification” of the alienated world that may be reached through genealogical analysis. 
The systematic development of such analysis would be nothing other than a critical his-
toriography, which should be an essential part of all critical social theory. On the other 
hand, Marcuse suggests the need to search within the history of praxis for certain images 
of the potentialities of human freedom that could serve as normative references for the 
present. With this second reflection, Marcuse identifies the normative source of praxis 
in links established by the political imagination between past and present. Consequently, 
he suggests a kind of link with the past that is not restricted to scientific social theory, but 
implies an active exercise of memory of the political actors, who recollect old struggles 
in order to be able to undertake new ones. Marcuse did not systematically develop or 
explain how these two dimensions, which could provisionally be called “genealogical-
destructive” and “fragmentary-normative,” articulate. All the same, he seems to indicate 
that both the genealogical historiography of social theory and the exercise of memory 
that unfolds in the field of praxis are necessary for social criticism to arise. 
II. A Moment before the Turn
A second important moment in Marcuse’s reflection on memory is found in Eros and 
Civilization [1955].17 Nevertheless, the roots of this turn can be traced already in two 
short texts of the thirties: “The Affirmative Character of Culture” [1937]18 and in “The 
Struggle against Liberalism in the Totalitarian Conception of the State” [1934].19 These 
writings allow us not only to better understand the articulation between the reflection 
on memory of the thirties and of Eros and Civilization, but also to shed light on the 
way in which Marcuse confronts those new philosophies of history that the Frankfurt 
program, presented by Horkheimer in 1933, identified as its main opponents. For this 
reason, it is worth recovering very briefly and schematically the most important points 
of both writings, before turning to Eros.
In “The Affirmative Character,” Marcuse analyses the ideological form that capitalism 
created to neutralize the emancipatory potential of bourgeois ideology. The “affirmative 
culture” is the spiritualization of freedom and pleasure, that is, its confinement to the in-
ner space of the individual soul.  The “soul” became in this context the object of cultiva-
17  Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).
18  Herbert Marcuse, “The Affirmative Character of Culture,” in Negations.
19  Herbert Marcuse, “The Struggle against Liberalism in the Totalitarian View of the State” (1934),  in 
Negations.
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tion of the educated man, his refuge from the social and sensitive world, that is, from the 
reified world of production. Beauty, truth, and freedom were only reached by those ca-
pable of creating in themselves a space of aesthetic contemplation, rational thinking, and 
moral reflection. Marcuse interprets this as a distortion and privatization of the great 
promise of early modernity: the development of man’s capacity for self-determination. 
Although this promise is no longer projected to a divine transcendence (as happened 
with the prevailing religious Weltanschaung in the Middle Ages), it is still restrained to 
a limited sphere, where no real emancipation can occur. When man is led to that sphere 
it is possible for him to ignore his own embodiment in the common world and remain 
indifferent to the praxis that can be deployed in it. A conciliatory effect is thus produced: 
the affirmative culture allows men to achieve in the individual sphere an experience of 
freedom and happiness that makes the reified reality of everyday life bearable. But this 
spiritual outflow is effective only thanks to certain ideological strategies to avoid the ma-
terial and historical world. Among these strategies, an important role is played by a link 
to the past especially akin to the Hegelian Verklärung: a secularized ideology of progress.
Broadly speaking, it could be said that the ideology of progress is for Marcuse an anti-
metaphysical, positivist, and secularized version of the Verklärung. It implies an under-
standing of history as an ascending path toward the fullest development. However, the 
guarantee of this ascension is not the cunning of Reason, but the spontaneous harmony 
derived from the interaction between rational individuals. “Rational” is understood here 
in instrumental terms; it supposes that obtaining individual benefit is the universal mo-
tivation of human action. According to this representation, history is ruled by certain 
“natural laws” capable of reconciling individual antagonisms (that is, the multiple and 
opposing interests of men) in a positive development. Therefore, the singularity of each 
historical experience and the atrocity or greatness of singular past events are dismissed 
by the consideration of history as a harmonious whole. Thus, all critical distance with the 
past is eliminated. The best thing that human initiative can do for the sake of the com-
mon good is to keep procuring the individual good. From this perspective, the return to 
the past is conceived as an idle activity or a mere storytelling of how present greatness 
has come to be.
Now, in the Germany of the thirties, Marcuse considers that modernity threatens not 
just to distort but to consummate the suppression of its early promise of freedom as self-
determination. This suppression is linked to a transformation of the affirmative culture, 
through which the “philosophy of progress” is replaced by a new mode of Verklärung: 
history as “natural force.”
In the irrationalist and vitalist discourses that prepared and accompanied the rise of Na-
zism, the idea of  a “natural historical legality” present in the bourgeois philosophy of prog-
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ress reappears, but in a new and radicalized way. In “The Fight against Liberalism,” Mar-
cuse argues that, in the totalitarian conception, historical progress is no longer animated 
by the constant harmonization of rational individual actions, but by vital powers totally 
independent of free individual praxis and will. These powers initiate “organic” processes, 
which belong to “the vital sphere of nature, eternal and immutable.”20 It is this sphere that 
pushes each individual to act, demanding him or her to surrender to its necessary develop-
ment. Marcuse points out that this totalitarian “man of action” is the opposite of the ideal 
individual of bourgeois culture who had the possibility of withdrawing from the common 
world to devote himself to the cultivation of his abstract freedoms in the fields of art and 
philosophy. On the contrary, now 
blood  rises  up  against  formal  understanding,  race  against  the  rational  
pursuit  of  ends, honour against  profit,  bonds  against  the  caprice  that  
is  called ‘freedom,’ organic totality against individualistic dissolution, valour 
against bourgeois security, politics against the primacy of the economy, state 
against society, folk against the individual and the mass.21 
By abandoning the bourgeois possibility of withdrawal to the spiritual sphere, the heroic 
man ends up completely turning his back on the freedom ideals of early modernity. Mar-
cuse understands this return from spiritual interiority to the “political arena,” this totalitar-
ian “call to action” and “to make history,” as the consummation of the ahistorization of the 
human condition and its radical depolitization. That capitalist “affirmative culture,” which 
in the nineteenth century impelled men to abandon the common and historical world and 
refuge in the soul, now invites them to abandon their soul to surrender to a world whose 
history no longer belongs to them.
Taking these reflections into account, we can better understand why in “The Affirma-
tive Character” Marcuse goes to the heart of the early bourgeois culture, already in deep 
decadence, to find, beyond or within its ideological character, a critical dimension:
Certainly, it [the affirmative culture] exonerated “external conditions” from 
responsibility for the “vocation of man,” thus stabilizing their injustice. But it also 
held up to them as a task the image of a better order. The image is distorted, and the 
distortion falsified all cultural values of the bourgeoisie. Nevertheless it is an image of 
happiness. There is an element of earthly delight in the works of great bourgeois art, 
20  Ibid., 3.
21  Ernst Krieck, Nationalpolitische Erziehung, 14th–16th impression (1933), 68; quoted by Marcuse in 
Ibid., 1.
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even when they portray heaven.22
Although bourgeois art, as a central part of the affirmative culture, is falsehood, distor-
tion, and forgetting, it also has a negative dimension. It is not mere illusion because, 
insofar as it provides an experience of liberation, even if momentary and distorted, it 
harbors an image of freedom that is denied in current reality. This is, in a nutshell, one 
of the central theses of Eros. Marcuse turns to art to find answers to the problems posed 
by reconciliatory philosophies of history. It is within the realm of art that he will initiate, 
years later, a systematic inquiry into the link between memory and emancipation. But 
from the 1937 essay to the famous work of 1955, significant changes have taken place in 
his thinking. In Eros it is Freud and not Marx who provides the central theoretical frame-
work, although the materialist perspective is not abandoned. More precisely, the novelty 
of the book lies in its attempt to recover Freud in order to understand the conditions of 
individual subjectivity in developed industrial societies. Here we can locate the second 
moment of the Marcusian reflection on possible links between memory and criticism.
III. Eros and Civilization (1955): Memory of Happiness. 
Following Freud, Marcuse affirms that as soon as memory is conquered by the reality 
principle, it acquires a repressive and reactionary function, since it is through memory 
that the superego introjects the parental commands and restrictions experienced in the 
first phases of human life. However, memory can also have an inverse function:
If memory moves into the center of psychoanalysis as a decisive mode of 
cognition, this is far more than a therapeutic device; the therapeutic role of 
memory derives from the truth value of memory. Its truth value lies in the 
specific function of memory to preserve promises and potentialities which are 
betrayed and even outlawed by the mature, civilized individual, but which had 
once been fulfilled in his dim past and which are never entirely forgotten. The 
reality principle restrains the cognitive function of memory —its commitment 
to the past experience of happiness which spurns the desire for its conscious 
re-creation. The psychoanalytic liberation of memory explodes the rationality 
of the repressed individual.23 
Marcuse transfers the link established by Freud between memory of the repressed and 
psychic liberation from the field of analytic experience to the realm of aesthetic experi-
ence. Art, he claims, preserves the mnemonic traces of both an archaic past of the species 
22  Marcuse, “The Affirmative Character of Culture,” 89.
23  Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 33.
Volume 19, Issue 2Essays in Philosophy
12 | eP1615 Essays in Philosophy
(before the constitution of civilization) and a primitive individual experience (before the 
constitution of the rational psyche). These mnemonic traces provide images that, when 
rediscovered, “yield critical standards which are tabooed by the present.”24 Through an 
imaginative exercise of memory, art is able to deny the prevailing principle of reality 
showing its incompatibility with past images of original joy and freedom. This denial 
has a positive aspiration: to realize in the future a nonrepressive configuration of the 
reality principle. It does not aim to realize in the present that archaic past in which the 
human organism was not different from any animal and society was not possible. On the 
contrary, the articulation between artistic imagination and memory produces an aspira-
tion to transform mankind’s present (already rational and socially organized) according 
to the ideal of satisfaction and harmony that that archaic past represents. More than a 
model to be reproduced, the past experience that art preserves and makes again pres-
ent provides a clue to understanding the oppressive character of present reality and the 
denied possibilities of overcoming it.
Now, it is worth asking if this approach to memory is compatible with the perspective 
developed in the writings of the thirties. It is clear that the past experiences to which 
the author refers in each case are different. For one thing, the anamnestic operation 
produced by art in Eros seems to have little to do with the procedure of genealogical 
unreification. Besides, the content of what is remembered through art is not related to 
concrete historical struggles in which the self-determination of man’s own conditions of 
life has been recognized as a possibility, desired and actively pursued. Insofar as it refers 
to a stage prior to the constitution either of the human group in a civilization or of the 
biological being in a rational individual, it could be said that the experience evoked by 
art is located in prehistory; it is not historical like the past events referred in the writings 
of the 1930s, even though it is a fact of human phylogenetic or ontogenetic evolution. 
This could suggest an ontological or platonic turn in the Marcusean reflection on memo-
ry.25 According to this, in Eros Marcuse proposed to abandon the field of historical praxis 
in order to find a normative horizon within an instance that is outside of praxis, that is, 
an immemorial experience of indefinite status26 rooted in the libidinal structure of man.
24  Ibid., 19.
25   This reading has been suggested by Martin Jay (see “Anamnestic Totalization”). He states that, unlike 
the writings of the 1930s, in Eros an “ontological theory of anamnesis” predominates, presenting the same 
metaphysical character that Marcuse himself had criticized in Heidegger and Hegel, while at the same time 
recovering a certain heritage of German Romanticism (see notes 7 and 14 on these criticisms).
26  Even the status of being just a “fact of evolution,” which seems to be the more adequate description, 
is relativized by Marcuse. The author affirms the merely “symbolic” and not historical-factual value of 
Freud’s anthropological speculations (Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 60) without explaining what should 
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In any case, this interpretation should be qualified. It is necessary to note that the libidi-
nal structure is not an anthropological invariant, but must also be understood histori-
cally. This creates some continuity with the reflections of the 1930s, since, despite ap-
pearances, the genealogical procedure recovered from Marx in those years is also present 
in Marcuse’s reading of Freud:
Freud’s theory here joins the great critical efforts to dissolve ossified sociological 
concepts into their historical content. His psychology does not focus on 
the concrete and complete personality as it exists in its private and public 
environment, because this existence conceals rather than reveals the essence 
and nature of the personality. It is the end result of long historical processes 
which are congealed in the network of human and institutional entities making 
up society, and these processes define the personality and its relationships. 
Consequently, to understand them for what they really are, psychology must 
unfreeze them by tracing their hidden origins.27
The genealogical procedure Marcuse proposed in the thirties for the analysis of social 
structures is now applied to the understanding of a dimension of human reality for 
which Marxism did not seem to provide appropriate categories: subjectivity. Accord-
ing to Marcuse, the analysis of the origins and development of our libidinal structure in 
light of the material conditions of present society reveals the presence of what he calls 
“surplus repression,” that is, an unnecessary repression. This repression may once have 
been necessary to the process of rationalization of society and the individual, but now 
it goes beyond all “rational repression” and just serves to maintain relations of domina-
tion. Nevertheless, those actors, who, as claimed by the traditional Marxist theory, were 
destined to carry out a social revolution were attracted by the exactly inverse project, 
for as is well known, Nazism found important support in the working classes. On the 
other hand, during the fifties and sixties new political subjects appear in the theoretical 
field as possible alternative path of change. Although very different from each other in 
their scopes, they have in common the fact of being described as “social movements” 
with anti-system aspirations: the Civil Right Movement and anti-Vietnam-war protests 
in USA, student activism around the ´68 in Europe and USA, and the women’s libera-
tion and counterculture movements which spread in the developed countries are the 
that mean. This lack of precision and vagueness is found again in passages such as those in which the 
memory that art awakens is described as an “imaginary temps perdu” (Herbert Marcuse, An Essay on 
Liberation [Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), 90. The way in which the status of being a “fact of evolutionary 
history,” a symbolic value, and this “imaginary character” combine remains uncertain and obscures a 
central point of Marcuse’s theory of memory.
27  Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 57.
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most important of them. Marcuse finds in them (such as many of them will find in 
Marcuse) new insights for understanding social transformation.28 The central character-
istic of these movements is not the critical position their protagonists occupy within the 
economic structure, but the way they resist and transform—through new relations with 
nature, others, and themselves—the libidinal constitution on which capitalism bases its 
mechanisms of domination. In this context, art becomes a privileged realm for the exer-
cise of critical memory. Art emerges as a concrete practice, although not identifiable in 
any way with direct political action, which can produce a transformation in the world 
of praxis by accompanying and promoting the process of rejection of the given that is 
expressed in the new and various forms of rebellion. Its function is to help undermine 
the libidinal conformation of subjectivities tied to surplus repression, by releasing the 
repressed erotic impulses akin to the spirit—if not revolutionary, at least promisingly 
rebellious—of the different antisystem movements.
So, Marcuse discovers that it is the complexity of libidinal economy that provides the 
key to understanding the new political scenario. The “subjective turn” in his analysis 
responds to the need to account for novelty in the field of praxis. It is this theoretical 
urgency and sensitivity to what the author considered the central political experiences 
of his time—and not a sudden romantic, Heideggerian, or Hegelian distrust of concrete 
and singular history—that leads him to move from a critical historiography in the realm 
of theory and an emphasis on the memory of past struggles to a kind of therapeutic 
memory linked to a psychic and archaic past to be recovered through art.29
Given that regarding the sense of Eros’s theoretical turn and its relative continuity with 
respect to the project of the thirties, it is possible to return to the question of whether, all 
the same, a considerable loss has not taken place in this period. It is important to note 
that while the images of freedom that come to us from the recovery of past struggles (as 
stated in the thirties) must be recognized as singular, situated, and plural ways in which 
the meaning of freedom was once interpreted, the repressed images of freedom that return 
through art (in the line of Eros) have lost that singularity, situationality, and plurality. These 
attributes refer to a timeless image of a general and indefinite happiness, unmarked by any 
particular political or social condition—in other words, without historicity. Moreover, this 
consideration of the origin and timeless nature of the anamnestic image of art leads to a 
28 For perspectives concerning this relationship from the point of view of the present see: Andrew Lamas, 
Todd Wolfson, y Peter Funke, The Great Refusal: Herbert Marcuse and Contemporary Social Movements 
(Philadephia Tokyo Rome: Temple University Press, 2017).
29  John O’Neill highlighted the interesting articulation between social theory and praxis that this way of 
conceiving memory enables in Marcuse’s thought. See John O’Neill, “Critique and Remembrance,” in On 
Critical Theory (London: Heinmann Educational Books, 1976).
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singular conception of the temporality of the liberated society. In a 1956 paper, Marcuse 
affirms that in a postrevolutionary society, “time would not seem linear, as a perpetual line 
or rising curve, but cyclical, as the return contained in Nietzsche’s idea of the ‘perpetuity 
of pleasure.’”30 This statement is enigmatic. It seems to suggest that the only way that Mar-
cuse finds to imagine an emancipated society that corresponds with the timeless image 
of freedom that his aesthetic theory postulates is to abstract human existence from the 
“whips and scorns of time” inherent in finite existence. That is to say, he must imagine the 
realization of the utopia as an overcoming of historical time as it is experienced by agents. 
Encouraged by a genuine historical concern and armed with his genealogical tools, Mar-
cuse seems to end up turning his back on the exercise of memory authentically anchored 
in history, which was his original aim during the early years at the Institute.
But this is not Marcuse’s last word on the topic. In the seventies, when the turmoil of the 
European antisystem movements of the sixties had subsided (and with them, perhaps 
also the theoretical urgency they aroused), he reflects again on memory and develops a 
new insight that in part attempts to solve this impasse of his thought. In the last years of 
his life he reformulates the aesthetic theory of the fifties, recovering in a renewed way his 
concern for the historicity of praxis and its normative references. A significant change 
of focus is the backdrop of this operation: while the main question of Eros was the pos-
sibility of radical transformation, in 1975 the central issue is the permanent self-critical 
movement of a free society. Hence, the inquiry into the critical link with the past is not 
directed to the path that can lead us to the abolition of the existing oppression, but to 
the moment when considerable levels of freedom have already been reached. The next 
section offers a review of this last theoretical shift, which can be located in Marcuse’s last 
book, The Aesthetic Dimension: Towards a Critique of Marxist Aesthetics (1975). 
IV. The Aesthetic Dimension (1975): Remembrance of a Irredeemable Past
Eros and Civilization, which contains some of the most enthusiastic passages of the au-
thor’s work, ends with a reflection that discourages enthusiasm and introduces a con-
sideration about the past that is not easy to integrate, but rather enters into tension with 
what has been sustained in the rest of the book: 
Men can die without anxiety if they know that what they love is protected from 
misery and oblivion. After a fulfilled life, they may take it upon themselves 
to die - at a moment of their own choosing. But even the ultimate advent of 
freedom cannot redeem those who died in pain. It is the remembrance of 
30  Herbert Marcuse, Five Lectures on Psycho-analysis: Psychoanalysis, Politics, and Utopia (Allen Lane, UK: 
Penguin, 1970), 41.  
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them, and the accumulated guilt of mankind against its victims, that darken 
the prospect of a civilization without repression.31
Following this intuition, The Aesthetic Dimension leads to an approach that differs from 
the more decidedly utopian that predominates in Eros. In the work of 1975, the author 
returns to his aesthetic theory of the fifties, but he explores more deeply the meaning of 
the memory of past suffering barely alluded to in the final passage of Eros:
While art bears witness to the necessity of liberation, it also testifies to its limits. 
What has been done cannot be undone; what has passed cannot be recaptured. 
History is guilt but not redemption. . . . Eros itself lives under the sign of finitude, 
of pain. The “eternity of joy” constitutes itself through the death of individuals. 
For them, this eternity is an abstract universal. . . . Inasmuch as art preserves, with 
the promise of happiness, the memory of the goals that failed, it can enter, as a 
“regulative idea,” the desperate struggle for changing the world.32
The implicit dispute with Hegel proposed by Horkheimer in 1933 can be easily recog-
nized in this passage. The artistic image of happiness presented in Eros, even though 
Marcuse admits that it is connected with the concrete experience of social movements 
and involved “in a desperate struggle,” does not oppose the Verklärung in the same way 
as The Aesthetic Dimension. In Eros, the memory addresses not the “ends that failed,” 
but the images of a mythical happiness. In that work, “to do justice to the past” seems 
to mean reviving the enthusiasm for the highest happiness ever dreamed, rather than 
bringing back to the present the bitter taste of past defeats. Quite the opposite, the an-
amnestic imperative of The Aesthetic is to remember the limits of all freedom that has 
been achieved. So the tragic moment in Eros that Marcuse only insinuated at the end 
and with a lugubrious tone—because it seemed destined to obscure the possibilities of a 
nonrepressive society—acquires in Marcuse’s last work a critical sense.
31  Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 237. It is important to note that this perspective was already suggested in 
some passages of the thirties, although it was not developed there either. At the end of the “The Affirmative 
Character,” Marcuse affirms that “even a nonaffirmative culture will be burdened with mutability and 
necessity” (98). Therefore, he seems to suggest that a nonaffirmative culture would be one that better 
helps us to carry this burden, the one that would make possible “dancing on the volcano, laughter in 
sorrow, flirtation with death” (Ibid.). In addition, “The Concept of Essence” mentions the permanence of 
irresolvable conflicts, even in an emancipated society, conflicts linked to our natural and finite condition 
and the impossibility of escaping death. However, in both texts, as in Eros, no positive consequences are 
drawn from such reflections. The insertion of the human and social condition in the finite temporality is 
still considered with a tone of resignation. This changes in the seventies, as is shown below.
32   Herbert Marcuse, The Aesthetic Dimension: Toward a Critique of Marxist Aesthetics (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1978), 68–69.
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The institutions of a socialist society, even in their most democratic form, could 
never resolve all the conflicts between the universal and the particular, between 
human beings and nature, between individual and individual. Socialism does not 
and cannot liberate Eros from Thanatos. Here is the limit which drives the revolution 
beyond any accomplished stage of freedom: it is the struggle for the impossible, 
against the unconquerable whose domain can perhaps nevertheless be reduced.33
In The Aesthetic Dimension, a certain tragic element of art leads Marcuse’s revolution-
ary vision to accept the inevitable persistence of the “unfinished” and, owing to this, the 
need of a permanent dynamic of self-revision and criticism. The central assertion of 
the book regarding memory is that, although not even the advent of a fully free society 
could “redeem those who died in pain,” the memory of those “ends that failed” can be-
come an impulse for the permanent self-reinvention of society. Hence, the memory of 
past suffering is not an irredeemable burden, but must serve as impulse toward the con-
stant broadening of the limits of mankind’s free self-determination. The decisive turn, in 
comparison with the approach of the fifties, is that this movement of social reinvention 
appears now for Marcuse not only as necessary (insofar as the final stage of freedom 
at which it aims will always remain distant), but also as desirable. At this point, a new 
reading of Freud, distinct from that of the fifties, becomes explicit. In a critical text on 
Norman Brown, of the end of the sixties, Marcuse expresses a consideration that is at the 
core of The Aesthetic Dimension: “Tension can be made nonaggressive, nondestructive, 
but it can never be eliminated, because (Freud knew it well) its elimination would be 
death—not in any symbolic but in a very real sense.”34 Marcuse agrees here with Freud 
in the paradoxical thesis that the ultimate realization of Eros would mean returning to a 
state of nirvana, that is, of absolute stillness, the inorganic state before the beginning of 
life—death. While this thesis was rejected in 1955, because, as Marcuse understood it at 
that time, it concealed the possibility of eliminating surplus repression, he now recovers 
it positively to rethink the conditions under which the erotic as such is possible. In order 
to avoid becoming its own opposite, Eros must be inserted in time. That means that it 
must be affirmed within the transience of what it is, and not only against it; within a mor-
tal environment, and not only against death.35 Thus, the dynamic of permanent social 
criticism is not only necessary because, after all, we have not been able to eliminate all 
33   Ibid., 71–72. 
34   Herbert Marcuse, “Love Mystified: A Critique of Norman O. Brown,” in Negations.
35  In the same text against Brown, he admits that there are “divisions and limits that are real and will 
continue to exist even with the advent of freedom, because all pleasure and all happiness and all humanity 
originates in life, in and with those divisions and limits” (Ibid.).  
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the suffering that the fact of being inserted in time infringes upon us (because we have 
not managed to enter into that mythical cyclical temporality); it is also necessary and 
desirable because Eros exists only in the finite condition, in the world of aspirations, in 
the movement of conquest. Finitude, nonrealization, and even destructiveness are un-
derstood now in positive terms: it is in them that praxis as such can arise, that is, where 
the freedom of finite beings may be realized. Two important conclusions can be draw 
from this. First: freedom consists in the movement of self-criticism and transcendence of 
the given, rather than in the definitive attainment of determined conditions or a certain 
state. Second: memory, insofar as it transmits images of happiness and its limits, is an 
intrinsic dimension of the exercise of freedom, since it is the impulse that gives praxis its 
opened character, its permanent disposition to recommence.36
So far, three different approaches to the link between memory, history, and criticism 
were identified. First, the genealogical deconstruction of what it is; second, the recollec-
tion of images of denied happiness (through the recovery of either historical struggles 
during the thirties, or repressed psychic experiences in the fifties); and finally, the mem-
ory of the limits of all attainable freedom. Although they pertained to different stages of 
the author’s work as well as present tensions and contradictions, it is possible to revisit 
the texts to examine to what extent they do not cancel each other out, but overlap and 
complement each other, albeit without reaching a definitive solution. Tracing back the 
origins of the given discloses it as a product of the creative capacity of men and woman 
and destroys its reified character. But this destructive operation can be productive only 
if such creative capacity, discovered by the genealogical process, allows us to visualize 
new possibilities of realization of the human, images of happiness and freedom hitherto 
denied. Such images of the human, though, could become affirmative if they conceal the 
suffering that fissures all plenitude and, above all, if they are subtracted from the finite 
and historical condition of praxis. In other words, the emphasis on human creativity and 
self-constituting freedom must be qualified by the memory of its shortcomings, of what 
remains “unconquerable.” Finally, given that theological redemption cannot be expected 
in the political realm, past suffering becomes an impossible moral imperative and an 
36  At this point I do not agree with Jay’s interpretation that only Adorno and not Marcuse understood the 
positive sense of nonreconciliation, of the nonidentity between subject and object (see Jay, “Anamnestic 
Totalization”). From my point of view, the old Marcuse did understand that, probably due to the influence 
of Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory (London: A&C Black, 1997). In this regard, it is worth highlighting the way 
in which Marcuse ends the “Recognitions” of The Aesthetic Dimension: “My debt to the aesthetic theory 
of Theodor W. Adorno does not require any specific acknowledgment” (vii). On the influence of Adorno 
on Marcuse, see Douglas Kellner, “Introduction,” and Gerhard Schweppenhäuser, “Afterword: Art as 
Cognition and Remembrance: Autonomy and Transformation of Art in Herbert Marcuse’s Aesthetics,” in 
Art and Liberation, vol. 4, ed. Douglas Kellner (London: Routledge, 2007).
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unbearable guilt. That is, it becomes a way of perpetuating the pain, if it is not converted 
into a current critical operation, into a transformation impulse directed at the injustices 
of the present time. Marcuse’s meditations on memory reached this point and were inter-
rupted by his death.   
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